You've had the raw figures, now here comes the analysis - from Professor Nick Sitter of the Norwegian School of Management BI in Oslo.
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The final counts are still being adjusted; Labour now seems to be getting 61 seats, not 62 (the Conservatives pick up the seat, and get 24, not 23).
Bondevik will tender his resignation after presenting the budget on October 14th, three days after the official opening of parliament. A new 'red-green' government of Labour, the Socialist Left and the agrarian Centre Party could be in place by Monday the 17th.
As Nick [ie, me – NA] says, Labour and the Progress Party are the big winners, partly because Labour promised more spending on public services; and Progress has long promised more spending across the board. The big question is how these two electoral successes will affect Norwegian politics, and not least public expenditure in an oil-rich country.
First, local commentators appreciate that it may seem somewhat odd to outside observers that parties presiding over such economic results (and the country's repeated high rankings in UN and World Economic Forum league tables on standard of living and competitiveness, respectively) are punished so severely by voters. Much of the answer is (as Nick notes) that the left promised higher spending on public services. The results confirm that the election was more about how to spend than about economic performance. Kindergartens, schools and the elderly dominated the campaign. The EU was not mentioned.
Rising incomes evidently do generate rising expectations, as many academics have argued. Economic prosperity is not enough; when countries accumulate (oil) wealth, the debate soon turns to how to spend it. Progress has been keen to spend more, as has the Socialist Left. The Conservatives and Labour have generally been more reluctant to spend oil money. So far Norway has kept the brakes on 'oil-spending', but even the outgoing centre-right government spent more than its own guidelines allowed for. This might be the emergence of a new 'curse' for Norwegian governing parties: a dilemma that reflects the need to maintain prudent fiscal policy in the face of popular demands for more spending. The Conservatives look forward to 2009.
Second, the Norwegian Labour Party has moved considerably to the left, both in its own campaign and in its choice of partners. The party is now considerably further from the Blairite Third Way than it was at the time of the last election. Given the particularly bad result in 2001, when the party lost votes to the Socialist Left, Labour seems to have feared that the unions might shift their support to (or share it with) that party. So this shift leftwards was hardly a surprise. But it raises the interesting question of how far the centre-left government will actually go in reversing recent industrial relations initiatives (the Confederation of Trade Unions, LO, has already made a series of 'urgent demands').
The big question here is whether this is a real (ideological?) change, or merely a tactical (opportunistic?) shift on the part of Labour. The campaign certainly helped not only to recapture votes lost to the Socialist Left, but also to strengthen the centre-left as a whole. Labour has been considerably more oriented toward 'public sector modernisation' in the recent past (i.e. positive towards Third-Way-style ideas).
Third, despite Labour's (apparent?) turn to the left, the coalition of Labour, the Socialist Left and the Centre Party faces a big challenge, given their policy differences. Labour has the advantage not only of being the major partner, but also of a comparatively strong election result. The election result was clearly not ideal as far as the Socialist Left is concerned, but whether this will make the party weaker in negotiations with Labour, or whether it will make it more recalcitrant, remains to be seen. Informal negotiations are already underway.
It is perhaps surprising that the 'red-greens' managed to cobble together a pre-election pact at all, given policy differences on a range of topics including environmental policy and industrial policy; spending the 'oil money'; schools reform; kindergartens vs paying mothers to stay at home; and spending on roads or public transport. However, distances between the mainstream Norwegian parties on economic policy are relatively small (this also hold across to the centre-right) and should not be exaggerated. Consensus remains the norm.
This does, however, raise the question of whether the three-party majority coalition will prove stronger in terms of policy-making than the minority governments that have ruled Norway for the last two decades. Labour claims that it will.
Fourth, turning to the centre-right, the rise of the Progress Party to a clear place as Norway's second-biggest party in the Storting may change the dynamics of opposition considerably! Progress has been the exception to the general rule of consensual economic policy, particularly in its demand for spending 'oil money'. On occasion, it out-performs the Socialist Left and Centre in terms of spending demands, which could leave these two smaller coalition parties in an awkward position, defending themselves against charges of 'low' spending.
Fifth, the EU question is (in all probability) on ice for another four years. The Conservatives and Labour are pro-EU, but the Conservatives agreed a 'suicide clause' for the 2001-2005 coalition with the Liberals (Eurosceptical, turning neutral) and Christian People's Party (oppose EU membership). This meant that the government would collapse if the EU issue was raised; and Labour is now set to embark on a similar pact with its two hard Eurosceptical partners.
Finally (and as Bernt Aardal pointed out on TV on election night), this was an election for which a high turnout should be expected: a close race between two clearly defined alternatives. Admittedly, the 76.1% turnout was up 1.6 points from 2001, but it is still the third-lowest since world war two (and below any average of the last two, three, four, etc elections that one might want to calculate).
It might also be worth noting that in terms of the actual number of votes cast, the three governing parties and the Progress Party together now seem to have outpolled the three red-green parties (Labour, the Socialist Left and the Centre) by 21,000 votes – about 1,271,000 votes to 1,250,000.
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Best,
Nick Aylott.
Please feel free to forward this message to anyone who might be interested. To join the Scandinavian Politics mailing list, send a message to me, the convenor (nicholas.aylott@pol.umu.se). If you want to send something to the list, or if you don't want to receive these occasional messages, just let me know. See also www.psa.ac.uk/spgrp/scandinavia/
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Dr Nicholas Aylott, research fellow (docent/forskarassistent) | Department of Political Science, Umeå University | SE-901 87, Sweden | www.pol.umu.se
